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New Evidence on the Role of Remittances on 
Health Care Expenditures by Mexican Households 
 
Using Mexico’s 2002 wave of the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 
(ENIGH), we find that international remittances raise health care expenditures. Approximately 
6 pesos of every 100 peso increment in remittance income are spent on health. The 
sensitivity of health care expenditures to variations in the level of international remittances is 
almost three times greater than its responsiveness to changes in other sources of household 
income. Furthermore, health care expenditures are less responsive to remittance income 
among lower-income households. Since the lower responsiveness may be partially due to 
participation of lower-income households in public programs like PROGRESA (now called 
Oportunidades), we also analyze the impact of remittances by health care coverage. As 
expected, we find that households with some kind of health care coverage – either through 
their jobs or via participation in PROGRESA – spend less of remittance income increments 
on health care than households lacking any health care coverage. Hence, remittances may 
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Remittances currently account for 2.8 percent of Mexico’s GDP and have doubled in 
dollar terms from a decade ago.  The relative magnitude and the growth rate of these transfers 
have  resulted in a number of inquiries regarding  the impact of remittances on migrant 
households.  How are remittances used by the family?  Do households use some of these inflows 
to accumulate human capital and, in particular, health assets as reflected by their health care 
expenditures?  And, if so, how does the responsiveness of health care expenditures to increases 
in remittance income compare to the responsiveness of health care expenditures to increases in 
other sources of household income?  Are remittances any different from other sources of 
household income when it comes to financing health care expenditures?  Do they contribute 
towards the equalization of health care expenditures across Mexican households with different 
income levels and health care coverage?   
In this study, we address the aforementioned questions with an analysis of the link 
between remittance income and health care expenditures by Mexican households.  In particular, 
the study has four objectives: (1) To determine whether and to what extent remittances are used 
to purchase health care services; (2) To learn about the importance of remittances, relative to 
other sources of income, in financing households’ health care needs; (3) To understand if poorer 
households are more likely to use remittance receipts to purchase health care  services, 
presumably helping equalize health care use across income groups; and (4) To examine whether 
remittances are used more intensively for health care by households that do not enjoy health care 
coverage through a public or private health care insurance program or through participation in a 
government program like PROGRESA.       2 
Interest in our first objective –to determine whether and to what extent remittances are 
used to purchase health care services– originates from the fact that many Mexican immigrants in 
the U.S. claim that health care expenditures are a primary end for remitting earnings to Mexico.  
According to data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP118) in Table 1, approximately 21 
percent of Mexicans remitting money  home declared health care  expenses as their primary 
motive for their monetary transfers.  This percentage is slightly below the percentage who 
reported remitting for food or maintenance (26  percent)  but  significantly higher than the 
percentage of individuals reporting remitting funds for the construction or repair of a house (4.03 
percent), debt payment (2.58 percent), and purchase of consumer goods (2.09 percent).  Yet, 
despite the claim that anticipated health care expenditures plays such a significant role with 
respect to sending money home, we know very little about the true impacts of remittances on 
health care expenditures.  Even if the intended purpose of remittances is to cover health care 
expenditures as the MMP claims, we do not have confirmation in the MMP of the actual use of 
remittances by the family members receiving these monetary inflows in Mexico.   Hence, we 
need to observe how households behave in the face of such transfers.  If remittances tend to be 
used for health care, this information should be of interest to policymakers who strive to promote 
health care in Mexico.  This interest is heightened today given the current downturn in U.S. 
economic activity, which along with more vigorous enforcement of immigration statutes, appears 
to be threatening the flow of remittances to Mexico.
1
                                                 
1 See Migration Policy Institute (2007) for evidence of recent declines in remittance inflows at the Mexican-state 
  Learning the extent to which Mexican 
households rely on remittances to finance health care expenditures can help officials plan for 
swings in remittance flows and their impacts on health care usage by the Mexican population.     3 
Our second objective is to learn about the importance of remittances, relative to other 
sources of income, in financing households’ health care needs.  Is one form of income more 
likely to be used for health care relative to the other?  If households receive an additional dollar 
(peso) in ordinary income, are they more inclined to spend it on health care?  Or are remittances 
more likely to be applied to health expenditures?  There are a variety of reasons as for why the 
responsiveness of household health care  expenditures to increases in remittance and non-
remittance income might differ.  First, remitters may have greater control over how their 
transfers are spent, thus leading to differences in intra-household bargaining with respect to 
expenditures using remittance income versus other sources of household income.  For instance, 
remitters may have different spending preferences relative to their family members in Mexico,   
insisting that a portion of the funds sent home be used to pay for health care needs.  The remitter 
may structure periodic inflows to ensure that his/her desires are carried out.  Second, the 
sensitivity of health expenditures to increases in remittances may differ from  increases in 
ordinary income because of differences in the predictability of the two inflows.  If, for example, 
remittance income is more sporadic or variable relative to other income, remittances might be 
used differently.  Such follows from the idea that unexpected income is more likely to be saved 
(life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) and Ando and Modigliani (1957)) 
while less predictable income streams will encourage financial (health) asset accumulation (the 
precautionary saving motive expressed by  Leland (1968)).  Regardless of the reason behind the 
differential propensity to use remittance income versus other ordinary income on health care, 
understanding differences between the two propensities can inform us on policies more suited to 
                                                                                                                                                             
level.   4 
alleviating health care deficiencies.  If households display a greater propensity to spend on health 
care from remittance income, it may be worthwhile to adopt policies that encourage and facilitate 
remittance transfers as a means to promote broader health care coverage while, at the same time, 
locating health services in migrant-sending regions.   
  Our third objective is to examine whether remittances can contribute to equalization in 
the usage of health care services by households across income levels by helping finance the 
health care expenditures of lower income families to a greater extent than those of their wealthier 
counterparts.  The received wisdom is that, due to income constraints, lower-income households 
are less likely to obtain adequate health care.  Additional inflows can be used to compensate for 
those deficiencies to a greater extent than in the case of higher-income households; however, this 
depends on the availability of low-cost health care for lower-income households via public 
programs like PROGRESA.   
  Hence, our fourth and final objective is to determine if there are differences in the use of 
remittances for health care among households with and without some form of health insurance or 
coverage of health care expenses.  While all households in Mexico are eligible for basic health 
care services through the Mexican Ministry of Health, a significant portion of the population 
avail themselves of more coverage through participation in additional public or private health 
insurance programs.  Of considerable interest is the ongoing Mexican program Oportunidades 
(formally PROGRESA) that offers transfers to poor families in return for participating in health 
and other programs.
2  This analysis will help us assess whether remittances can contribute to 
equalization in the usage of health care services by households with and without some kind of   5 
health care coverage by helping finance the health care expenditures of families lacking any type 
of health care coverage.     
  We find that remittances are partially  used  to pay for health care expenditures.  
Approximately 6 pesos out of 100 pesos of remittance income increments are spent on health 
care.  Furthermore,  health care  expenditures are more responsive to changes in remittance 
income than to changes in other sources of household income.  Only 2 pesos out of 100 peso 
increments in other sources of household income are spent on health care.  Additionally, while 
health care expenditures exhibit greater remittance income sensitivity among households in the 
top half of the income distribution, health spending is more responsive to remittance increments 
among households without any health care coverage.  Because poorer households are more likely 
to be enrolled in PROGRESA, which offers cash transfers conditional on participation in health 
and nutrition programs, it is reasonable for higher-income households to spend a larger fraction 
of their remittance income on health care than lower-income households with covered health 
care needs.  Overall, our findings add to the growing evidence of the potentially crucial role of 
remittances in migrant-sending communities. 
II.  Background and Literature on Health Care, Migration and Remittances  
In 2002, Mexico spent 6.1 percent of its GDP on health, a significantly smaller amount 
than the 14.6 percent of GDP spent on health by the United States (WDI 2005).  But what is even 
more noteworthy is that while Mexico ranks first in Latin America with respect to per capita 
GDP, it lags behind the Latin American average in terms of health care  expenditures.  On 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 PROGRESA and Oportunidades transfers are conditioned on recipients’ participation in basic health and nutrition 
programs, as well as on children’s educational attainment.     6 
average, health care expenditures account for 6.8 percent of GDP in Latin America (WDI 2005), 
a slightly more generous amount in comparison to Mexico’s 6.1 percent.     
While Mexican families with members employed in the formal sector generally receive 
health care services through Mexico’s social security system, the unemployed, informal and self-
employed workers and their families (referred to as the uninsured) are relegated to obtaining 
basic and often incomplete health care through the Ministry of Health.  To partially address 
deficiencies in proper access to health care  services,  the Mexican government implemented 
PROGRESA (now called Oportunidades) in 1997 in selected areas of the country.  PROGRESA 
offered cash transfers to poor families in Mexico conditional on their participation in health and 
nutrition programs.  Specifically, families enrolled in PROGRESA were required to participate 
in prenatal care programs, well-baby care and immunization, nutrition monitoring and 
supplementation, and preventive health care  programs.
3  While the size of the covered 
population, as well as the list of illnesses and medicines covered by government programs have 
been rapidly expanding,
4
  In analyzing the role that remittances may play in the provision of health care, it is 
important to consider the relationship between migration and health.  A small literature addresses 
 this form of insurance still fails to provide the same coverage provided 
to formal sector workers and their families.  Consequently, it is reasonable to ask the degree to 
which remittances impact health care expenditures. 
                                                 
3  However, as of 2002, it was still estimated that between 40 and 60 percent of the Mexican population was 
“uninsured” (Secretaría de Salud 2002, Frenk et al. 2003).   
4 In 2005, with the purpose of addressing the still large number of uninsured individuals, the Mexican government 
approved Seguro Popular, a narrower program that is intended to simply focus on increasing access to health care 
services.  There is no condition to participate aside from a small yearly premium, which then gives participants the 
right to specified health services.  By the end of 2007, over 7 million families were covered by Seguro Popular and 
over time the program is expected to encompass more segments of the population (Secretaría de Salud 2008 at 
http://www.seguro-popular.salud.gob.mx/).     7 
health outcomes among households in which some members have migrated.  A number of the 
studies conclude that migration of a household member results in poor health outcomes for the 
non-migrating family members.  Using the MMP, Kanaiaupuni and Donato (1999) attribute 
increases in infant mortality to family separations.  The transmission of habits and lifestyles 
(social remittances) that may be incompatible with healthy outcomes may further disadvantage 
health in families with migrating members (Levitt 1997).  Finally, migration may contribute to 
poor health outcomes in communities that experience much out-migration on account of the 
importation of communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis or HIV (Perez-Stable et al. 1986).   
  While these studies speak to the unfavorable impacts of migration on health outcomes, 
many studies  also note that migration has the potential to improve health outcomes for the 
families that remain behind.  For instance, Levitt (1997) argues that improved health behaviors 
can also be remitted “socially” leading to improved  health  outcomes.  Likewise,  Frank and 
Hummer (2002) measure higher birth weights in families with a migrant member –possibly due 
to the acquisition of positive health behaviors from migrants.   
  In addition to migration, monetary transfers or remittances can affect health by relaxing 
liquidity constraints that would otherwise restrict access to health care.  Kanaiaupuni and Donato 
(1999) argue that, despite the initial disruptive effects of family separations, over time, as 
migration becomes “institutionalized” and the household receives monetary remittances, infant 
mortality significantly drops.  In the same vein, López Cordova (2004) takes  advantage of 
variability in remittance receipt  rates across Mexican  municipalities  and  concludes  that 
remittances lower infant mortality rates.  Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2004) link increased birth 
weight and lowered infant mortality rates to both monetary remittances and health knowledge,   8 
whereas  Duryea, López-Córdova and Olmedo (2005) conclude that the acquisition of better 
housing infrastructure (e.g. improved housing, water and refrigeration of food) via remittances is 
crucial in reducing infant mortality.   
  Also looking at the impact of remittances in Mexico, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) and, 
more recently, Valero-Gil (2008), find that remittances raise health expenditures in Mexico.  
Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) take a first look at the ENIGH data to examine how remittances 
affect household  expenditures on specific health care  services, from routine primary care to 
hospitalizations.  Using instrumental linear regression methods, they find that hospitalization 
expenditures display the largest responsiveness to remittance income.  However, primary care 
expenditures are also higher among remittance-receiving households who, on average, spend 
between 5 and 9 percent of their remittances on primary care services.  Yet, their analysis falls 
short of gaining a better understanding of whether  Mexican households are likely  to use 
remittances, as opposed to other sources of income, to purchase health care services, as well as to 
how these propensities to consume remittances to purchase health care services differ according 
to household income strata and health care coverage.  Valero-Gil (2008), also using the ENIGH, 
estimates that one-tenth of remittances are spent on health expenditures in Mexico.  Yet, his 
analysis does not address the endogeneity of remittances with respect to household expenditures. 
   Summarizing, the relatively small literature on this topic appears to have focused on the 
link between migration and health outcomes, with only a handful of studies zeroing in on the 
actual link between the receipt of remittances and health outcomes.  While the improvement of 
health outcomes is society’s ultimate goal, understanding the impact of remittance income on 
health care expenditures is also of great importance as it relates to a topic of considerable policy   9 
interest, i.e. how remittances are being used in developing countries.  To this end, we follow up 
on the existing literature and further examine how remittances impact health care expenditures.   
III.    Modeling Health Care Expenditures 
  We briefly outline a standard model of the demand for medical care based on the model 
of the demand for health developed by Grossman (1972) in which we incorporate any remittance 
inflows received by households.  The starting point in this model is a health production function: 
( ) H Z m g H , = , where m stands for medical care and the vector ZH includes a variety of factors 
affecting the production of health along with medical care (m), such as (but not limited to): 
demographic  and economic characteristics (e.g. age, education,  household composition  and 
wealth), stock of health (e.g. weight and information on family health-related endowments), and 
family lifestyle (e.g. diet, exercise patterns, or smoking/drinking/drug use habits).   
  Consumers  (in our case households)  are assumed to maximize a utility function, 
( ) H X U U , = , that depends on the consumption of two normal goods: X (market goods) and 
health (H).  Each household tries to maximize its utility by reaching the highest indifference 
curve possible subject to a budget constraint.  In our case, the budget constraint is a function of 
remittances from abroad (R) which, along with other sources of income (I), are used to pay for X 
(with price Px) and for any medical care (m) (priced at Pm) used to produce health (H) as follows: 
R I m P X P m x + ≤ + .  From the previously described  tangency, we derive an equilibrium 
combination of market goods and medical care: ( ) 0 0,m X , where m0 stands for the equilibrium 
demand for medical services measured by health care expenditures.  Therefore, households’ 
health care expenditures depend on:   10 
(1)    ( ) H m X Z P P I R f HCE , , , , =   
where  Pm  itself is likely to vary according to a variety of factors, such as  proximity and 
availability of health care  services, health care  insurance, or household participation in 
government programs providing some health care coverage (e.g. PROGRESA).    
  Increases in remittance income are equivalent to increases in non-labor income which, 
other things equal, should shift the household’s budget constraint outwards in a parallel fashion.  
Because only household non-labor income would be changing, an increase in remittance income 
should result in  an income effect  according to which the household would  enjoy a higher 
disposable income enabling it to reach a higher indifference curve.  The new tangency should 
result,  ceteris paribus,  in a higher consumption of X  and  m  –both normal goods.  We  test 
whether, as predicted by the theory, an increase in remittance income raises  health care 
expenditures (via an increase in the household’s medical use) and, if so: (i) to what extent, and 
(ii) how the change in health care expenditures due to an increase in remittance income compares 
to the impact of similar increases in other sources of household income.    
IV.  Data   
  The empirical analysis uses data from the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los 
Hogares  (ENIGH), a nationally representative survey carried out by the Mexican statistical 
institute, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), with the purpose 
of providing information on the size, structure, and distribution of Mexican households’ income 
and expenditures.  The survey is intended to be nationally representative and distinguishes 
households in rural areas (fewer than 2,500 inhabitants) from households in urban areas (more 
than 2,500 inhabitants).  The first wave of the survey was administered in 1984 and it has been   11 
carried out biennially since 1992.  In this project, we use the 2002 survey, which provides more 
up to date and reliable data on remittance receipts and health care expenditures.
5
In addition to general socio-demographic and employment information on  household 
members, the survey collects detailed information on all income flows (net of taxes) received by 
the household over the past six months, including international money transfers, earnings from 
employment and from self-employment, asset income, and income from domestic transfer 
programs.    Other  Mexican surveys containing nationally representative information are not 
suitable for carrying out this analysis.  The Mexican Life Family Survey does not distinguish 
domestic from international remittances and the Mexican Census, while providing information 
on remittance receipts, does not ask about health care expenditures or other spending patterns.   
   
In Table 2 we provide some descriptive information on the frequency and levels of the 
various sources of income in order to better appreciate their relevance for households.  After 
purging outliers from our sample,
6 we divide households in the ENIGH into two broad income 
groups: (i) those that earn the median income or less, and (ii) those that earn more than the 
median income.
7
                                                 
5 Table A in the appendix contains the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
  We then present descriptive information for all households as well as for 
lower-income  and  higher-income households.  Overall, household income composition is as 
expected.  For instance, jobs are the most frequent source of household income with 71 percent 
of all households reporting earnings from employment.  Business earnings constitute the third 
most frequently reported source of income, with 45 percent and 39 percent of households in the 
6  We delete those observations in the top 2 percent of the remittance income and other household income 
distributions in order to eliminate a number of implausible observations.   
7 The division of households into lower-income and higher-income groups is determined by summing all sources of 
household income, except for remittance income.  Households with total incomes (excluding remittance income)   12 
lower and upper half of households, respectively, receiving some entrepreneurial income.  
Lower-income households appear more likely to receive domestic income transfers than higher-
income households (45 percent versus 25 percent).  In contrast, capital and property returns are 
more frequently reported by higher-income  households.  Not surprisingly,  remittances are 
skewed towards the less advantaged, with two percent of higher-income households receiving 
remittances from abroad  compared to eight  percent of lower-income households.  Finally, 
looking at mean receipts (that is, conditional on receiving that particular type of income inflow), 
we find that remittances  contributed  the  least to household income  among  higher-income 
households.  However, remittances amounted to the second most important source of income for 
households in the bottom half of the income distribution.   
The ENIGH also contains detailed information on a variety of household expenditures.  
Of interest to this study are health care expenditures for the entire household during the previous 
three months.  As shown in top panel of Table 3, about 57 percent of households (a total of 9,582 
out of 16,810  households in the survey) reported using medical services over the survey’s 
previous 3-month period in 2002.  Yet, due to the availability of publicly provided medical 
services, health care expenditures only amounted to 5 percent of total household income (i.e. 796 
pesos out of an average household income of 16,141 pesos in Table A).  The figures in Table 3 
summarize health care expenditures according to various household characteristics.  Households 
residing in rural areas, families  headed by  women,  less educated household heads, and 
households in the bottom half of the income distribution, are all less likely to use health care 
services  than their corresponding counterparts.  In addition, their  average  health care 
                                                                                                                                                             
equal or below the median are characterized as lower-income households, while those with incomes (excluding   13 
expenditures in pesos are, correspondingly, lower than those incurred by households in urban 
areas, by families with more educated household heads and by households in the upper half of 
the income distribution.     
Of particular interest  to us is  the effect of remittances on the  usage of health care 
services.  According to the figures in Table 3, remittance-receiving households are more likely to 
use health care services and they also spend more on health care.  However, this result is solely 
conditioned on household remittance receipt, ignoring other concurrent household traits that may 
lead to differential health care usage of remittance-receiving households and households lacking 
such receipts.  In what follows, we describe the methodology employed to help us examine the 
role of remittance income on household health care spending.    
V.  Methods  
As with other production and investment activities (Stark 1982, Taylor 1992, Rozelle et 
al. 1999), health care expenses (HCE) are constrained by remittance income (R) and a vector 
HCE Z   that incorporates information on a variety of covariates thought to be important 
determinants of household health care  expenditures, such as:  household income  (I), cost of 
medical care (Pm), cost of other goods and services consumed by the household (PX), and all the 
characteristics  included in ZH  in equation (1) thought  to affect the production of health.  
Therefore, household health care expenses can be modeled as follows:   
(2)  HCE HCE Z RE HCE ε α α α + + + = 2 1 0 . 
However, in estimating health care expenditures and examining how remittance income 
and other sources of household income affect such expenditures, there are various econometric 
                                                                                                                                                             
remittance income) above the median are considered higher-income households.     14 
issues we need to take into account.  One of the problems refers to the potential correlation 
between household remittances and the error term, in which case the coefficient estimate for 
remittance income is biased.  There are two potential sources for this noted correlation.  The first 
source originates in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias.  
Household remittances may be related to a wide range of characteristics we lack information on, 
ranging from household wealth (as captured by ownership of a house, piece of land, business, 
livestock or some other physical asset) to the family’s health stock which, in turn, can impact 
household  health care  expenditures.  Those  correlations may  result  in  either positively or 
negatively biased estimates of the impact of remittances on health care expenditures.
8
The second source of potential correlation between household remittances and the error 
term in equation (2) results from the joint determination of household remittance income and 
health care expenditures.  We address the simultaneous determination of household remittance 
income and health care  expenditures  by  using information on lagged  household remittance 
income.  Specifically, we model health care expenditures in the past quarter (e.g. quarter 2) as a 
function of the receipt of remittances during the preceding three-month period (e.g. quarter 1).  
Yet, while predetermined, household remittances and household health care expenses may still 
be endogenous due to remaining unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable biases.  Hence, 
we also make use of instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of remittance income.   
   
                                                 
8 As noted by Wooldridge (2003, pp. 89-93), the sign of the omitted variable bias depends on the sign resulting from 
interacting the expected sign of the coefficient that the omitted variable would have in the health care expenditure 
equation (i.e. βwealth>0 or βHealth<0) and the sign of the correlation between remittances and the omitted variables in 
question (e.g. corr(RE, wealth)<0 and corr(RE, Health)<0).  Hence, depending on the relevance of various omitted 
variables in driving both household remittances and health care expenditures, the bias can either be positive (as in 
the case of missing information on the household’s health stock) or negative (as in the case of missing information 
on household wealth).       15 
A)  Modeling Household Remittance Income 
We  address the endogeneity of remittance income using an instrumental variable 
approach.  We instrument remittance income with its predicted value as derived from a model of 
remittance receipts.  Because  only 5 percent of households receive remittance income, the 
distribution that applies to R  is both discrete and continuous.  In such cases, an option is to use 
selection models (such as the Heckman-type model) where one first estimates the likelihood of 
receiving remittances  using a probit model.  Subsequently,  using a slightly different set of 
covariates to allow for the identification of the likelihood of remittance receipt model, one can 
model  the  peso figure remitted while accounting for the sample  selection that occurs when 
focusing on remitters by OLS (e.g. Hoddinott 1994, Funkhouser 1995, Cox et al. 1998).  This 
type of modeling has the advantage of allowing the likelihood of remittance receipt to be shaped 
by different variables from those determining the peso amount received from abroad by the 
household.  However, the results from such models are sensitive to identification exclusions that 
are debatable given the difficulty of envisioning factors that affect the likelihood of remittance 
receipt, yet have no influence on the remittance amount received by the household.     
An alternative that allows us to circumvent this identification problem is to use a Tobit 
model (Brown 1997, Ravallion and Dearden 1998, Schrieder and Knerr 2000).  The Tobit model 
allows us to account for the discrete and continuous nature of the distribution of remittance 
income while modeling the likelihood of remittance receipt and the peso amount received by the 
household as a function of the same covariates.  One disadvantage of the Tobit model is that the 
regressors shaping the likelihood of remittance receipt and the amount finally received have the 
same signs.  However, as noted by Wooldridge (2003, p. 573), it is possible to informally assess   16 
the appropriateness of the Tobit model for our analysis by estimating a separate probit model of 
the likelihood of remittance receipt and comparing the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of 
the statistically significant explanatory variables in that model to the coefficients in the Tobit 
model.  We do so and, given the similarity of the results, we choose to predict remittance income 
receipts using a Tobit specification where remittances are determined as follows:     
(3)  R R Z R ε β β + + = 1 0
*  with  ( )
* , 0 max R R =  and  ) , 0 ( N ~
2 σ ε R .   
The vector  R Z   incorporates information on a variety of covariates thought to be 
important determinants of household remittance income receipt (see Table B in the Appendix).  
including household composition variables, the educational attainment of household members 
and household income excluding remittances.  Additionally, we account for the extent of out-
migration in the state of residency as captured by the percent of the state’s population that has 
emigrated to the U.S. in the past.  In this manner, we capture the important role played by 
networks in facilitating the out-migration of household members likely to remit money home in 
subsequent periods.   
In addition to the aforementioned regressors, all of which can also be argued to impact 
household  health care  expenditures, equation (3) needs to include at least one variable  –an 
instrument (or IV)– that is correlated with household remittance income but not with household 
health care expenditures.  That instrumental variable should be adequately excluded from the 
main equation modeling household health care  expenditure  for identification purposes.  We 
select two variables to be included in  R Z  as instruments: the road distance in kilometers to the 
U.S. border (from the capital of the Mexican state in which the household resides) and U.S. 
wages in Mexican emigrant destination states.  Information on the road distance to the U.S.   17 
border is readily available from a road atlas.  However, because the ENIGH does not have any 
information regarding household emigration, we exploit information on state-level migration 
networks to derive information about the U.S. wages earned by Mexican emigrants from the 
various Mexican states included in the survey.  Specifically, we use data from the Mexican 
Migration Project to determine the most common U.S. destinations for emigrants from each of 
the Mexican states in the ENIGH survey.  We then use this information to construct weighted 
averages of 2002 U.S. wages for the stock of emigrants from each of the Mexican states.
9
What is the logic behind our choice of instruments?  Road distance in kilometers to the 
U.S. border and U.S. wages in Mexican emigrant destination states can be argued to be closely 
linked to the dollar amounts received by household members in Mexico.  Distance can raise the 
cost of sending money home –especially in the case of hand carried informal transfers.  Distance 
also weakens family ties, resulting in lower remittance receipts.  On the contrary, higher wages 
in U.S. destination areas will likely raise emigrants’ disposable earnings and increase the 
likelihood and level of remittances sent home.  Furthermore, both instruments are unlikely to 
represent individual household preferences owing to the way in which they are defined.  
Distance to the U.S. border is measured from the state capital; therefore, it does not reflect any 
particular household residential location preference.  Likewise, U.S. wages in Mexican emigrant 
destination states are derived from information on state-level migration networks from a different 
survey and, as such, do not directly reflect choices made by the individual households contained 
in our survey.   
   
                                                 
9 For example, in the state of Durango, the MMP indicated that in 2002 about 31 percent of emigrants resided in 
California, 28 percent resided in Texas and 26 percent in Illinois.  Therefore, we compute the average U.S. wage for 
emigrants from Durango as follows: [0.31*(California wages in 2002)+0.28*(Texas wages in 2002)+0.26*(Illinois 
wages in 2002)+0.15*(average U.S. wages in 2002)].     18 
Our identifying assumption is that road distance to the U.S. border and U.S. wages do not 
affect the health care  expenditures of Mexican households.  One potential threat is that the 
instruments may be related to household characteristics that affect their health care expenditures, 
such as household out-migration and household wealth.
10
                                                 
10 For instance, wealthier households to be more likely to place migrants in economically more attractive U.S. states. 
  A second possible threat to the 
validity of our instruments could come from the fact that Mexican  migrants from different 
regions may traditionally send migrants to specific U.S. states.  In that case, the instruments 
could be just capturing regional differences across Mexican states which result in different out-
migration patterns  that are, in turn, correlated with household health care expenditures.  
Unfortunately, the ENIGH lacks information on household emigration and wealth.  However, in 
addition to accounting for as many household characteristics correlated with emigration and 
wealth as possible (such as household education and income), we include information on per 
capita GDP at the state level, as well as on the extent of out-migration in the state as captured by 
the percent of the state’s population that has emigrated to the U.S. in the past.  Per capita GDP 
captures differences in the standard of living in each state, which are possibly correlated to out-
migration patterns, e.g. maybe richer states have migrants in U.S. states that are farther away 
from the border or in U.S. states where earnings are higher.  In turn, the percent of migrants in 
the state addresses the important role played by networks in facilitating the subsequent out-
migration of other individuals in the community to a particular location in the U.S.  In this 
manner, we also account for any community network effect on household health care practices 
and expenditures  which, in any event, is likely to be second-order (to the effect of other 
household characteristics) in household health care expenditure decisions.        19 
We also thoroughly inspect both instrumental variables to ascertain their suitability as 
instruments from an econometric point of view.  First, we examine whether they are significantly 
correlated with household remittance income –the endogenous regressor to be instrumented.  As 
we shall discuss in what follows, our instruments help explain the peso amount received by 
households from abroad at the 5 percent significance level, suggesting that there is a strong 
correlation between the instruments and household remittance income.  Secondly, we assess the 
exogeneity of our instruments to the extent this is possible.  A priori, there is no theoretical 
reason to believe that our two instruments would affect household health care expenditures other 
than through the  receipt of remittances  –our endogenous regressor. Indeed, remittances can 
impact household health care  expenditures via a higher purchasing power that enables the 
household and community to access better health care.  The model already accounts for the role 
played by monetary remittances, which is the variable we are trying to instrument for.  
Alternatively, remittances are accompanied by the transmission of health knowledge and 
lifestyles on the part of migrants.  However, the vector  R Z  already includes information on the 
extent of out-migration in the state of residency, which is likely to serve as a good proxy for 
these effects.  Nonetheless, as an informal check, we estimate our health care model including all 
its regressors, along with remittance income and the two instruments being used.  Neither 
instrument  appears  to have a significant direct impact on health care expenditures once we 
control for household remittance receipts.
11
                                                 
11 Results are available from the authors. 
  Finally,  since remittance income is being 
instrumented by two variables, we use over-identification tests to examine the exogeneity of the 
instruments.  Because of existing concerns regarding the low power of these tests in case of   20 
general misspecifications (e.g. Newey 1985), we use Sargan’s (1958) as well as a recommended 
variation of the Basmann (1960) test –the Basmann-LIML form of the test (see Staiger and Stock 
1997).  Both tests examine the exogeneity of instrument conditional on the other one being valid.  
That is, in both tests, the null hypothesis is that the omitted instrument is uncorrelated with the 
error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  However, to the extent that the 
rationale for the two instruments is similar, (i.e. the U.S. location choices of Mexican emigrants) 
non-rejection of the null hypothesis is likely to support the validity of both instruments (Baum et 
al. 2002, Woodridge 2003).  As shown in Table 4, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis, 
which suggests that our instruments are valid from an econometric perspective.  Nevertheless, 
we carry out the analysis with and without instrumental variables to help us sign the direction of 
the bias in our remittance income estimates.   
B)  Modeling Household Health Care Expenditures 
In order to measure the responsiveness  of household health care  expenditures  to 
remittance income, we derive predicted household remittance income ( ) R ˆ  from equation (3) and 
use it to instrument for remittance income in equation (4), which models household health care 
expenditures as follows:   
(4)  HCE HCE Z R HCE ε α α α + + + = 2 1 0 ˆ  
  Once more, as in the case of remittance income, we are confronted with the fact that 
HCE  equals zero for a large number of households (almost half of the sample according to the 
figures in Table A in the appendix).  Additionally, our dependent variable is highly skewed and 
approximately log-normally distributed.  Many papers have discussed the difficulties of properly 
modeling medical expenses, making it impossible to credit them all here (e.g. Duan et al. 1983   21 
and 1984, Hay and Olsen 1984, Manning 1998 and Mullahy 1998, among many others).  
Nonetheless, let us start by saying that using a Tobit model to estimate equation (4) would be 
inappropriate for a number of reasons, including the fact that the Tobit model assumes that a 
single mechanism determines both likelihood as well as the peso amount spent on health care. 
(i.e.  j HCE z Z HCE P ∂ > ∂ ) | 0 ( and  ( ) j HCE z HCE Z HCE E ∂ > ∂ 0 , | are constrained to be  both 
negative or both positive).  But, unlike for remittances, we can easily foresee the possibility that 
different mechanisms govern the likelihood of incurring any health care expenditure and the peso 
amount spent on those services (e.g. health care coverage via insurance or PROGRESA).  
  An alternative to using a Tobit model is the self-selection or Heckman model.  However, 
as noted by Duan et al. (1983), among other authors, the self-selection model is rejected for 
various reasons, such as: (a) assuming that the functional form is known a priori and that it yields 
a bivariate normal error; (b) estimating unconditional (uncensored) expenditures when, in fact, 
the zeros in health care expenditures are true zeros and not merely missing information; and (c) 
displaying poor numerical and statistical properties (in particular, the inability to separate 
selection effects from heteroscedasticity and nonlinearity).   
Therefore, we opt for a simple two-part model where the initial likelihood of using health 
care  services and products  during the past three months is separated from the process 
determining overall household health care expenditure amounts.  In the first part of the model, 
we estimate the likelihood of encountering any health care expenditure via a probit model as 
follows: 
(5)  ( ) ( ) 1 , 0 ~ , ˆ 1 ) , ˆ | 0 ( 1 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 0 N Z R Z R HCE P HCE HCE HCE ε α α α + + Φ − = =    22 
Subsequently, in the second part of the model, we model household health care expenditures 
during the past three months for households encountering health care expenditures as follows: 
(6)   ( )
2
2 , 2 , 2 2 , 1 2 , 0 , 0 ~ , ˆ ) 0 | log( σ ε α α α Normal Z R HCE HCE HCE HCE + + = >   
As noted by Duan et al. (1983), among others, equations (5) and (6) can be estimated 
separately by maximum likelihood.  In computing meaningful marginal effects, we address two 
problems that arise in the re-transformation process: (1)  2 , HCE ε may not be homoscedastic and (2) 
2 , HCE ε may not be Normally distributed.  We first test for heteroscedasticity in  2 , HCE ε  and are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity regardless of whether we instrument for 
remittance income or not.
12  Next, we test for the Normality of the log-scale error term and 
conclude that it is not Normal.
13
VI.  Results  
  We thus address the non-Normality of the error term when the 
latter is homoscedastic using Duan’s (1983) smearing estimator.   
  In order to gain some insight into the impact of remittances on health care expenditures, 
we first examine how these monetary inflows impact both the likelihood of incurring health care 
expenditures and the  peso amount  spent on  health care.    Namely, do remittances increase 
spending on health care, and if so, to what degree?  Secondly, we compare the sensitivity of 
health care expenditures due to changes in remittance income to their sensitivity to changes in 
other  sources  of household income.  If remitters earmark the funds sent home for specific 
                                                 
12 Using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity (where: H0:constant variance), we get a test 
statistic: Chi2(1) = 0.27 with Prob>Chi2=0.6034 when we do not instrument remittance income and a test statistic: 
Chi2(1)=0.40 with Prob>Chi2=0.5283 when we do.  Hence, in both instances, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
a homoscedastic error term.        23 
purposes –such as covering health care needs,  and can monitor those expenditures, we may 
observe a greater responsiveness of health care expenditures to monetary inflows from family 
abroad than to other sources of household income.  Alternatively, differences in the time pattern 
of receipts may result  in different expenditure patterns.  Finally, we  disaggregate the  data 
according to whether the household’s income is below or above the  median income for 
households in our sample in order to gain insights into differential impacts by income levels.  Do 
remittances help even out health care expenditures across income groups by raising health care 
expenditures among poorer households to a greater extent than among  their wealthier 
counterparts?  Because many lower-income households participate in public programs covering 
some basic health care needs (as is the case with PROGRESA that covers prenatal care, well-
baby care and immunization, nutrition monitoring and supplementation, and preventive 
checkups), while some higher-income households are likely to enjoy other forms of health care 
coverage through public or private insurance provided through their jobs, it is also of interest to 
examine the impact of remittance income on health care expenditures distinguishing households 
according to their health care coverage.  Hence, we group households according to whether they 
have any form or health care coverage (via PROGRESA  or via private or public insurance 
offered through their jobs).  Then, we examine how, once we control for household income, 
remittances help equalize health care expenditures across households with and without health 
care coverage by raising the health care expenditures of households with no health care coverage 
to a greater extent than those of households with some form of health care coverage.   
                                                                                                                                                             
13 The skewness/kurtosis tests for Normality indicate that the log-scale error is not Normal with Prob>Chi2=0.0000 
regardless of whether we instrument or not for remittance income.  Hence, in both instances, we reject the null 
hypothesis of a Normally distributed error term.        24 
  Because  remittance  income may be endogenous to health care  expenditures, we first 
estimate  a Tobit model (equation 3)  to derive the predicted levels of household  remittance 
income per quarter.  These predictions are later used in place of household remittance income in 
the estimation of the two-part instrumental variable models of health care expenditures.  The 
results from estimating equation (3) are displayed in Table B in the appendix.  Of particular 
interest to us is the statistical significance of distance from the U.S. border and average wages at 
the U.S. destination state –our instruments –  after accounting for a range of household 
characteristics, including their state’s out-migration rate.  They both have the expected signs 
(that is, remittances decrease with distance from the U.S. border and increase with wages in U.S. 
destination states) and are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.
14
A)  Responsiveness of Health Care Expenditures to Remittance Income  
   
Our first objective is to examine whether remittances are used to purchase health care 
services and, if so, to what extent.  The figures in Table 4 help us answer that question.  Table 4 
reports  the results from estimating  two-part  models  of  health care  expenditures incurred by 
households with and without instrumenting for remittance income.  Aside from the slightly larger 
magnitude of the IV estimates signaling the downward bias of the non-IV estimates,
15
                                                 
14 Other findings are as expected.  For instance, female headed households, larger families, and households with a 
larger number of young children or elderly members receive greater remittance transfers.  In particular, female 
headed households receive 105 more pesos per quarter relative to male headed households.  Each additional 
household member raises remittance inflows by 18 pesos per quarter (although elderly members raise household 
health care expenditures to a greater extent than young children).  Additionally, families residing in rural areas, in 
states that have experienced more out-migration, and in states where emigrants earned higher U.S. wages also enjoy 
larger transfers.  In contrast, richer households, households with more working members, as well as those living 
further from the U.S. border, receive smaller remittance transfers from abroad than poorer households, households 
with fewer working members, and households closer to the U.S. border, respectively.   
 the non-
15 As noted earlier, the non-IV estimates are likely to be biased owing to the endogeneity of remittances stemming 
from omitted variables biases.  In this particular case, the non-IV estimates appear to be biased downwards.  This 
means that variables, such as household wealth (in the form of housing, land or similar assets), which are positively   25 
IV and IV estimates are qualitatively similar as reflected by their signs and significance levels.  
Of particular interest to us is the potential impact of remittance income on health care 
expenditures, which appear to rise with income transfers from abroad in both the instrumented 
and non-instrumented estimations.  A 100 peso increment in remittance income raises health care 
expenditures  anywhere  between  5 and 6 pesos,  depending on whether we refer to the non-
instrumented or the instrumented results.
16
B)  Responsiveness of Health Care Expenditures to Other Sources of Household Income  
  
Our second objective is to learn about the importance of remittances, relative to other 
sources of income, in financing households’ health care needs.  Is one form of income more 
likely to be used to finance health care expenditures than the other?  Is health spending more 
sensitive to monetary inflows from family abroad than to other sources of household income?  
By comparing the marginal effect of increments in remittance income and in income excluding 
remittances we can determine the relative sensitivity of these expenditures to the two sources of 
income.   
                                                                                                                                                             
linked to health care expenditures, yet inversely related to remittance inflows, play a significant role in downward 
biasing the non-IV estimates.     
16 Other variables also display the expected effects.  For instance, increments in other sources of household income 
also raise health care expenditures as would be expected for a normal good.  Female headed households are less 
likely to incur health care expenditures; however, their health care expenditure amounts do not seem to significantly 
differ from those of non-female headed households.  In contrast, the number of young children and the number of 
elderly members raise both the likelihood of incurring health care expenditures as well as their levels.  It is, perhaps, 
for the same reason that, while a larger number of working members increases the household’s financial access to 
health care and, as such, the likelihood of incurring such expenses, a larger number of working individuals –who are 
less likely to be young children or elderly members– is associated with lower household health care expenditures.  
Finally, household location matters.  Rural households incur smaller health care expenditures than urban households, 
possibly due to differences in the proximity and availability of health care services.  Additionally, households 
residing in Mexican states with more out-migration are more likely to incur health care expenditures and spend more 
on such services.  This could be, in part, due to the transmission of health knowledge and the dissemination of 
certain health practices and behaviors by migrants to their families back home (Kanaiaupuni and Donato 1999, 
Frank and Hummer 2002).  Lastly, households in richer states, as captured by their per capita GDP, are also more   26 
The figures in Table 4 indicate that a 100 peso increase in income raises expected health 
care  expenditures by approximately  2 pesos.  This is much less  than the 6 peso increment 
resulting from a 100 peso increase in remittances.  Therefore, the responsiveness of health care 
expenditures to increases in remittance income is about 3 times greater than the responsiveness 
to similar increases in other sources of household income.  What might explain this finding?  
Perhaps, remitters do have preferences that differ from those of their households back home and 
are able to control, from afar, the use of the funds  they send.  In any event, the greater 
responsiveness of health care expenditures to increases in remittance income than to increases in 
other sources of household income is not surprising considering that up to 21 percent of remitters 
in the MMP claim health care to be a primary motive for sending money home.  Health care 
seems to be a priority for migrants. 
C)  Responsiveness of Health Care Expenditures by Household Income Level 
Due to deficiencies in access to financial markets, remittance income may play a crucial 
role among lower-income households facing greater budgetary constraints than among higher-
income households.  Hence, our third objective is to learn about how remittances impact health 
care expenditures of lower-income versus higher-income families.  To do so, we first divide our 
sample into lower-income (households with incomes below or equal to the median income) and 
higher-income (households with incomes above median income) groups  and  re-estimate  the 
health care expenditure model for the two groups.
17
                                                                                                                                                             
likely to spend on health care even if, possibly linked to differences in their health practices or access to coverage, 
their health care expenditures appear to be slightly lower.    
  As when working with all households in 
17 Because the division of households by income may seem arbitrary, we also distinguish households according to 
whether their incomes fall below or above the mean.  Likewise, we also try limiting the analysis to households in the 
lowest and highest income quartiles.  Our results are robust to these alternative specifications.       27 
Table 4, we display the results from estimating two-part models of health care expenditures 
when we do not instrument for remittance income and also when we do.  For the sake of brevity, 
we report the coefficients, standard errors, and marginal effects for remittance income and for 
ordinary income only.
18
As in Table 4, the responsiveness of household health care expenditures to increases in 
remittance income is greater (between two and three and a half times larger) than its 
responsiveness to other sources of household income.  However, health care expenditures are 
more responsive to increases in remittance income in richer households than in lower-income 
households.  Approximately 4 pesos from a 100 peso increase in remittance income are spent on 
health care in lower-income households as opposed to 7 pesos in higher-income households.  
Why might this be the case?  Perhaps higher-income households spend more on health care 
because they are not as resource constrained as lower-income households.  Remittance income 
may be used for more pressing needs in lower-income households.  Alternatively, lower-income 
groups may have access to cheaper medical care (through PROGRESA),  resulting in lower 
health care expenditures.  Hence, in what follows, we examine the responsiveness of household 
health care expenditures to remittance and other sources of household income according to 
whether the household has any type of health care coverage.   
   
D)    Responsiveness of Health Care Expenditures by Health Care Coverage 
  A significant portion of the Mexican population has either health insurance coverage 
through their jobs or through PROGRESA/Oportunidades –an ongoing anti-poverty program 
offering cash transfers to poor families in Mexico conditional on their participation in health and 
                                                 
18 Complete results are available from the authors.   28 
nutrition programs.  Because  of the close link between household income and having basic 
health care needs covered, our last objective is to learn how, once we account for household 
income,  remittances  are used to finance health care expenditures  conditional on having  or 
lacking some kind of health insurance or health care coverage.  With that purpose, we distinguish 
between households according to whether or not they have some kind of health care coverage 
through their employment or through special government programs.   
All working individuals are asked whether they receive any health care benefits through 
their jobs and, if so, whether their health care needs (and, in turn, those of their eligible family 
members) are met by public medical services from IMSS, ISSTE, PEMEX, etceteras, or by 
private medical services.  Approximately 42 percent of households in our sample fall in this 
category.  Additionally, households report whether they receive any transfers from PROGRESA.  
Households participating in PROGRESA are required to participate in health and nutritional 
programs.
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Results from the estimations by household health care coverage are presented in Table 6.  
Uninsured households spend a greater share of increases in remittance income on health related 
expenditures  than  insured households.  In particular, households lacking any health care 
coverage  spend  approximately 7 pesos out of a 100 peso increment in  remittance  income, 
  About 14 percent of households in our sample participate in PROGRESA and only 
1 percent of households receive health benefits though the employment of a household member 
and participate in PROGRESA.  If the household has health insurance coverage through work or 
via participation in PROGRESA, it is labeled as “insured”.  Households that do not enjoy such 
coverage are labeled as “uninsured”.       29 
whereas households with health care coverage spend only 5 pesos.  This is reasonable given that 
household with health care coverage are likely to enjoy access to cheaper health care services.  
Furthermore, they help us understand why lower-income households in Table 5 –more likely to 
be eligible for PROGRESA– display a lower elasticity of health care expenditures with respect to 
remittance income than their higher income counterparts.   
Finally, as in Tables 4 and 5, the figures in Table 6 confirm the fact that health care 
expenditures exhibit a higher responsiveness to increases in remittance income than to increases 
in other sources of household income.  Indeed, uninsured households spend 2.6 pesos of a 100 
peso increment in other sources of household income on health care relative to 7 pesos in the 
case of an increase in remittance income.  Likewise, households with some kind of health care 
coverage spend 1.7 pesos of a 100 peso increment in other sources of household income on 
health care, as opposed to 5 pesos in the case of an increase in remittance income.   
VII.     Final Remarks  
In this study we model the impact of remittance income on Mexican households’ health 
care expenditures while taking into account the potential endogeneity of remittances as well as 
the discrete and continuous nature of health care expenditures.  We find that remittances increase 
both the likelihood of incurring health care  expenditures  and the level of expenditures 
undertaken.  In particular, six pesos of every 100 peso increment in remittance income are spent 
on health.  While remittances may then be considered to have a small impact on household 
health care expenditures, a case can be made that these inflows substantially increase health care 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Since our data refer to 2002, no families at the time were enrolled in other government programs described earlier, 
such as Seguro Popular.   30 
spending.  Remittance-receiving households get an average of 6,109 pesos per quarter in 
remittances which, given the marginal effect of remittance income on health care expenditures, 
raise health care expenditures by 367 pesos, i.e. a 50 percent increase.  In that regard, remittances 
are an economically significant determinant of health care expenditures.  Furthermore, 
remittances  are also important  in driving health care expenditures when compared to other 
sources of household income.  After all, the sensitivity of health care expenditures to variations 
in the level of international remittances is almost three times greater than its responsiveness to 
changes in other sources of household income, suggesting that emigrants may have a say in how 
remittance funds sent home are spent.     
  We also find remittance income has a significantly greater influence in shaping the health 
care expenditures of households in higher income groups relative to lower-income households.  
In particular, a 100 peso increment in remittance income raises the health care expenditures of 
households in the top half of the income distribution by 7 pesos, whereas a similar increment in 
remittances only raises the health care expenditures of households in the bottom income half by 
about 4 pesos.  This finding may be due to a combination of liquidity constraints on the part of 
lower-income households, the scarcity of health care  services in the areas that low income 
households reside and/or to participation of lower-income households in government programs 
that provide health care at zero or greatly reduced costs.  We explore that last possibility further 
by examining the sensitivity of health care  expenditures  to remittance income according to 
household health care coverage.  We find that households lacking any health care coverage 
exhibit greater remittance income sensitivity.  In particular, a 100 peso increment in remittance 
income among those without health care coverage increases expenditures by 7 pesos, somewhat   31 
more  than  the 5 pesos spent by households who are covered through their jobs or through 
PROGRESA.  Hence remittances may contribute to equalization in the usage of health care 
services by households with and without some kind of health care coverage by helping finance 
the health care expenditures of families lacking any type of health care coverage.     
Given current and projected declines in remittance flows, it is important that policy 
makers brace for reductions in the usage and accessibility of health care services.  This decline is 
likely to be greater than what might ordinarily be found in recession periods due to the finding 
that the elasticity of health care expenditures out of remittances exceeds that of non-remittance 
income.  Furthermore, given the greater reliance on remittance income to finance health care 
expenditures of families lacking some kind of health care coverage, the decline in remittances 
may particularly hit households that need them the most.   
To conclude, we would like to note that, while expenditures on health care may constitute 
a good human capital investment, greater health care expenditures may not translate into better 
health outcomes due  to factors we are unable to account for with our data.  For instance, 
households’ life styles, diets and exercise regimes –all factors we lack information on, may be an 
overriding determinant of their health outcomes, irrespective of household's usage of health care 
services.  Yet, the potential role of remittance income on health should not be dismissed as even 
non-health care related expenditures financed via remittances –such as investments in improved 
housing, water delivery systems, food refrigeration, and other durable goods, can also lead to 
improved health outcomes (Duryea, López-Córdova and Olmedo 2005).  As such, the analysis 
herein reinforces the potential for remittance income to promote household well-being.     32 
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Table 1 
Motive for Remitting to Mexico 
 
Primary Motive  Share 
Food and Maintenance  25.64 
Health Care expenses  21.23 
Construction or Repair of House  4.03 
Debt Payment  2.58 
Purchase of Consumer Goods  2.09 
Other  1.08 
Savings  0.88 
Purchase of House or Lot  0.58 
Education Expenses  0.37 
Start/Expand a Business  0.19 
Purchase of Agriculture Inputs  0.19 
Purchase of Livestock  0.19 
Recreation  0.13 
Purchase of Vehicle  0.04 
Finance a Special Event  0.03 
Purchase of Tools  0.01 
Unknown  16.22 










All  Lower Half of HHs  Upper half of HHs 
% HH 
reporting 
Mean   % HH 
reporting 
Mean   % HH 
reporting 
Mean  
Total Income  100  16141  100  6496  100  25683 
Job Earnings  71  14876  58  6005  83  21054 
Business Earnings  42  7945  45  2908  39  13745 
Property Returns  3  5933  2  2837  4  7408 
Income Transfers  35  4257  45  2385  25  7559 
Capital Returns  6  5776  5  1630  8  8196 
Income Transfers from Abroad  5  6109  8  6061  2  6284 
Notes:  Mean figures for each of the categories are reported in pesos. 
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Table 3 
Household Health Care Expenditures by Demographic Characteristics 
 
Likelihood of Incurring Health Care Expenditures  Proportion  t-statistic 
All HHs                                                                                                                     0.58 
By Area where Household is Located 
Household is located in rural area  0.52  - 
Household is not located in rural area  0.59  -7.69*** 
By Head of Household 
Household is Headed by Female  0.54  - 
Household is not Headed by Female  0.58  -4.12*** 
By Education Attainment 
Less Educated Household Heads  0.56  - 
More Educated Household Heads  0.59  -3.13*** 
By Income 
Household in Bottom Half  0.52  - 
Household in Upper Half  0.62  -12.48*** 
By Remittance Receipt     
Household Does not Receive Remittances  0.57  - 
Household Receives Remittances  0.69  -7.73*** 
Average Health Care Expenditures  Mean   t-statistic 
All HHs                                                                                                                      796 
By Area where Household is Located 
Household is located in rural area  685  - 
Household is not located in rural area  834  -8.41*** 
By Head of Household 
Household is Headed by Female  642  - 
Household is not Headed by Female  831  -0.73 
By Education Attainment 
Less Educated Household Heads  753  - 
More Educated Household Heads  874  -5.71*** 
By Income 
Household in Bottom Half  486  - 
Household in Upper Half  1059  -23.59*** 
By Remittance Receipt 
Household Does not Receive Remittances  775  - 
Household Receives Remittances  1106  -4.80*** 
Notes:  Figures for average health care expenditures are in pesos.   The hypothesis being tested is H0: [mean (household receives 
remittances) – mean (household does not receive remittances)] = 0.  The alternative hypothesis is: HA: [mean (household receives 
remittances) – mean (household does not receive remittances)] ≠ 0.   *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, 
**at the 5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.     
Source: INEGI, 2002 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares.   38 
Table 4: Impact of Remittance Income on All Health Care Expenditures 
 
Independent Variables  Two Part Model without IVs  Two Part Model with IVs 
Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect   Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect 
Second Part             
Remittance Income  0.0001***  7.93E-06  0.0470  0.0001***  1.10E-05  0.0612 
Income Excluding Remittances  3.46E-05***  1.37E-06  0.0187  3.50E-05***  1.41E-06  0.0192 
Female Headed Household  -0.0144  0.0420  -22.8398  -0.0106  0.0429  -21.4124 
Household Size  -0.0230  0.0156  -15.4337  -0.0217  0.0160  -15.7632 
No. of Young Kids  0.1230***  0.0230  72.9658  0.1198***  0.0237  72.6328 
No. of Elderly Members  0.2666***  0.0315  145.9961  0.2509***  0.0322  139.1058 
No. of Members with College Education  0.0293  0.0294  22.3285  0.0189  0.0300  18.7991 
No. of Members with HS Education  0.0142  0.0165  8.4857  0.0099  0.0169  7.4787 
No. of Working Members in Mexico  -0.0363**  0.0181  -0.3473  -0.0349*  0.0185  0.6401 
Rural Household  -0.0496  0.0401  -61.9059  -0.0829**  0.0413  -78.4183 
Percent Migration  0.0672***  0.0147  57.8912  0.0555***  0.0154  53.3432 
Per Capita GDP  -8.82E-06  6.26E-06  0.0017  -1.06E-05*  6.35E-06  0.0013 
Observations  9608  9187 
Significance  F-statistic = 99.92 with Prob>F = 0.0000  F-statistic = 92.57 with Prob>F = 0.0000  
First Part             
Remittance Income  4.45E-05***  6.37E-06  -  0.0001***  7.57E-06  - 
Income Excluding Remittances  7.69E-06***  9.19E-07  -  7.75E-06***  9.40E-07  - 
Female Headed Household  -0.0558**  0.0253  -  -0.0556**  0.0258  - 
Household Size  -0.0157*  0.0097  -  -0.0181*  0.0099  - 
No. of Young Kids  0.0605***  0.0148  -  0.0601***  0.0152  - 
No. of Elderly Members  0.0383**  0.0191  -  0.0365*  0.0195  - 
No. of Members with College Education  0.0303  0.0194  -  0.0338*  0.0197  - 
No. of Members with HS Education  0.0061  0.0103  -  0.0093  0.0106  - 
No. of Working Members in Mexico  0.0597***  0.0115  -  0.0604***  0.0117  - 
Rural Household  -0.1315***  0.0242  -  -0.1294***  0.0248  - 
Percent Migration  0.0911***  0.0093  -  0.0914***  0.0097  - 
Per Capita GDP  2.10E-05***  3.89E-06  -  2.22E-05***  3.93E-06  - 
Observations  16810  16074 
Significance  Wald Chi-sq = 513.80 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000  Wald Chi-sq = 504.49 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000  
Correlation of Instruments with Remittance Income     
F-test for distance  -  F(1, 16061) = 6.16 with Prob>F = 0.0131 
F-test for distance & wages  -  F(2, 16061) = 4.37 with Prob>F = 0.0126 
Over-identification Test of Instruments     
Basmann-LIML Test  -  Chi-sq(1) = 0.206 with P-value = 0.6496 
Sargan N*R-sq Test  -  Chi-sq(1) = 0.207 with P-value = 0.6495 
Notes: *** Statistically different from zero at the 1% level, **at the 5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  The regression includes a constant.     39 
Table 5 




Without IVs  With IVs 
Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect   Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect 
Second Part             
Remittance Income  9.72E-05***  9.80-E06  0.0304  0.0001***  1.29E-05  0.0433 
Income Excluding Remittances  7.34E-05***  8.47E-06  0.0232  7.13E-05***  8.68E-06  0.0239 
Observations  4498  4288 
Significance  F-statistic = 19.87 with Prob>F = 0.0000  F-statistic = 17.18 with Prob>F = 0.0000 
First Part             
Remittance Income  4.86E-05***  7.42 E-06  -  7.70E-05***  8.53E-05  - 
Income Excluding Remittances  2.49E-05***  4.94E-06  -  3.05E-05***  5.05E-06  - 
Observations  8550  8150 
Significance  Wald Chi-sq = 211.22 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000  Wald Chi-sq = 242.71 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000 
Higher-income households 
Independent Variables 
Without IVs  With IVs 
Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect   Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect 
Second Part             
Remittance Income  6.04E-05***  1.47E-05  0.0613  7.18E-05***  2.53E-05  0.0705 
Income Excluding Remittances  2.66E-05***  1.66E-06  0.0199  2.76E-06***  1.70E-06  0.0207 
Observations  5110  4899 
Significance  F-statistic = 38.54 with Prob>F = 0.0000  F-statistic = 37.10 with Prob>F = 0.0000 
First Part             
Remittance Income  5.87E-05***  1.58E-06  -  5.76E-05***  2.00E-05  - 
Income Excluding Remittances  5.75E-06***  1.14E-06  -  5.49E-06***  1.16E-06  - 
Observations  8260  7924 
Significance  Wald Chi-sq = 215.37 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000  Wald Chi-sq = 207.82 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000 
Notes: *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level, **at the 5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  The regression includes a constant, 
along with all the regressors in Table 4.   40 
Table 6 




Without IVs  With IVs 
Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect   Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect 
Second Part             
Remittance Income  7.53E-05***  9.37E-06  0.0484  9.29E-05***  1.39E-05  0.0673 
Income Excluding Remittances  3.97E-05***  2.12E-06  0.0255  3.99E-06***  2.17E-06  0.0260 
Observations  4643  4481 
Significance  F-statistic = 48.87 with Prob>F = 0.0000  F-statistic = 45.20 with Prob>F = 0.0000 
First Part             
Remittance Income  3.77E-05***  7.47E-06  -  5.92E-05***  9.77E-06  - 
Income Excluding Remittances  1.46E-05 ***  1.67E-06  -  1.50E-05***  1.72E-06  - 
Observations  7674  7397 
Significance  Wald Chi-sq = 368.75 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000  Wald Chi-sq = 363.43 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000 
Insured Households 
Independent Variables 
Without IVs  With IVs 
Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect   Coefficient  S.E.  Marginal Effect 
Second Part             
Remittance Income  7.10E-05***  1.50E-05  0.0442  7.73E-05***  1.80E-05  0.0517 
Income Excluding Remittances  3.35E-05***  1.83E-06  0.0161  3.40E-05***  1.89E-06  0.0166 
Observations  4965  4706 
Significance  F-statistic = 57.11 with Prob>F = 0.0000  F-statistic = 53.35 with Prob>F = 0.0000 
First Part             
Remittance Income  5.44E-05***  1.23E-05  -  6.52E-05***  1.22E-05  - 
Income Excluding Remittances  6.59E-06***  1.18E-06  -  6.60E-06***  1.21E-06  - 
Observations  9136  8677 
Significance  Wald Chi-sq = 286.20 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000  Wald Chi-sq = 280.50 with Prob>Chi2 = 0.0000 
Notes: *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level, **at the 5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  The regression includes a constant, 
along with all the regressors in Table 4.                                                                                 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A 
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
 
Variables  Mean  S.D. 
Any Health Care Expenditures   0.5651  0.4958 
All Health Care Expenditures (excluding zeros)  795.5646  2398.4960 
Any Remittance Income   0.0508  0.2195 
Remittance Income  (excluding zeros)  6109.4080  5254.7980 
Income Including Remittances  16141.01  14212.42 
Income Excluding Remittances  15720.80  14292.44 
Female Headed Household  0.1983  0.3987 
Household Size  4.2053  2.0765 
No. of Young Kids  0.6238  0.8828 
No. of Elderly Members  0.2410  0.5459 
No. of Members with College Education  0.2557  0.6334 
No. of Members with HS Education  1.2610  1.2424 
No. of Members with Less than HS  2.2511  1.7790 
No. of Working Members in Mexico  2.8528  1.7596 
Rural Household  0.2820  0.4500 
Percent Migration   1.6668  1.1621 
Per Capita GDP (in thousands of pesos)  5210.825  2789.501 
Distance to the U.S. in Kilometers  1060.2150  538.6577 
Average wages at U.S. destination state   745.5891  46.2537 
Notes:  Mean figures for monetary categories are reported in pesos, unless otherwise specified.                                                                                         
Source: INEGI, 2002 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares.   42 
Table B 
Tobit Model of Remittance Income 
 
Variables  Coefficient  S.E. 
Partial Effect on the 
Probability of Being 
Uncensored 
Partial Effect on   
the Conditional 
Expectation 
Income Excluding Remittances  -0.3753***  0.0326  -2.01E-06  -0.0115 
Female Headed Household  2852.9290***  545.1051  0.0174  102.5033 
Household Size  588.1620***  213.4584  0.0032  18.0925 
No. of Young Kids  728.3222**  334.9896  0.0039  22.4039 
No. of Elderly Members  1405.5710***  394.5033  0.0075  43.2368 
No. of Members with College Education  127.4462  604.9462  0.0007  3.9204 
No. of Members with HS Education  405.8889*  246.9485  0.0022  12.4856 
No. of Working Members in Mexico  -822.7876***  259.0353  -0.0044  -25.3098 
Rural Household  3780.8030***  518.2615  0.0230  135.7644 
Percent Migration   3696.8450***  230.3217  0.0198  113.7187 
Per Capita GDP   0.2064*  0.1126  1.11E-06  0.0063 
Distance to the U.S. in Kilometers  -1.5054**  0.6067  -8.08E-06  -0.0463 
Average wages at U.S. destination state   14.2644**  6.1466  0.0001  0.4388 
Total Observations  16074 
Uncensored Observations  857 
LR Chi2   955.74 
Prob > Chi-sq  0.0000 
Notes: *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level, **at the 5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  The 
regression includes a constant.   